I The role .of the courts in industrial relations
Sir Jvor Richardson* The topic for discussion today is the role of the courts in industrial relations. I begin by n1aking an in1111cdiate qualification and by indicating 2 areas on which I wish to focus. The qualification is that in referring to the courts, I an1 speaking of the role of the c.:ourts of general jurisdiction~ particularly the High Court and Court of Appeal. rather than courts and tribunals \Vith specialist responsibilities and notably the Court of Arb: itration and its successors. the Industrial Court the Arbitration Court and now~ soon, the Labour Court. The firs: t n1atter I propose to explore quite brieny concerns the special features ofindustrial relations \Vhich bear on the role of the courts of general jurisdiction in conflict resolution in that fic' ld. The second i to say son1ething about the experience of the Court of Appeal in industrial rehttions questions in recent years.
As we all know, the industrial conciliation and arbitration systen1 pioneered in this country has been of profound social and ccono· mic significance. The orig: inal legislation enacted in 1894 had as its stated purpose (in tern1s of the long title) to encourage the fonnation of industrial un· ions and associations and facilitate the settlernent of industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration. The san1e broad goals are reflected · in the Labour Relations Act. 1987 . even if the language used has a n10r· e familiar contemporary ring.l'he stated purposes of that A. ct (again in terms of the long title) are: (a) to facilitate the forn1ation of effective and accountable unions and effective and accountable employers organisations {b) to provide procedures for the orderly conduct of relations bet\veen \\'Orker and en1-ployers (c) to provide a fran1ework to , enable agrcen1ents to be reached between \VOrkers and en1 players. All 3 have an in1portant bearing in considering \Vhat if any part the courts of general jurisdiction have to play in industrial relations.
The . first is directed to the role of unions and e1nployer organisations as agent!) of their members. History tells us that in the absence of any organisation there is too great a risk of inequality of bargaining po\ver. of exploitation of· ,vorkers. and of dan1agc 'to the social fabric. There arc clear social equity considerations and obvious econon1ic in1plications. As \Vell as econon1ic survivaL en1ployment often plays a central part in detcnn in ing ·vvhether individuals are able 10 achieve n1any of their aspirations. Equally in1portant for n1any people~ a job is closely linked to feelings of self-\\'Orth and dignity. For etnployers loo. and the \Vider good of society. the labour market should function fairly and efficiently. The presence of effective and accountab' le unions and employer organ. isations .is the first step to that end.
The second and third stated purposes of the Labour Relations Act arc to provide procedures for the orderly conduct of relations between workers and etnployers and to provide a fran1e· work to enable agree. ments to he reached bet\\reen workers and en1ployers. The second brings out the crucial point that in the 'Lives of productive enterprises and in the lives of\\'Orke:rs alike. the en1ployment of labour needs to be seen as a continu: ing relationship. As in other hun1an relationships. there · will be highs and lows. there will be tẽnsions and hiccups. They Sir lvor Richardson have to be resolved in a way that will allow that continuing relationship to endure for the cotn n1on good.
There are 3 reasons \Vhy the courts of general jurisdiction are not well fitted for that kind of conflict resolution role. The first is the adversal)' method of conOict resolution which is the traditional way in which disputes are resolved in the courts of general jurisdiction. By definition it focuses on the dispute itself rather than on a continuing relationship: it pits one side against the other and there is no built-in encouragement to find common ground, let alone a central role for 1nediation and conciliation. The second is that the field of industrial relations calls for the developn1ent of broad expertise and experience. Jt requires specialised judges who becon1e steeped in the field and who work with those from union and employer ranks who, through their own background and experience. have the confidence of their organisations. Such tribunals are likely to be n1ore sensitive instrurnents for resolving these disputes. The third and associated reason is that the orderly resolution of industrial connict . in an ongoing relationship is not si:n1ply a n1atter of applying legal principles and attempting to discover on exatnination \vho is right and \\'ho is wrong. Such questions are often not susceptible to that kind of cold analysis in a forum far removed fron1 the reality of industrial life and industrial strife. Bringing in the law and the regular court processes n1ay sin1ply exacerbate the human drarna going on behind an industrial dispute. So .it is that for over 90 years our legislation has provided a systen1 ofla\\' designed to settle industrial disputes outside the ordinary courts. Even so, there is always scope under the industrial relations legislation to obtain clarification of questions of law arising in the specialised court by way of review or appeal and I shall come back to that shortly when revie\\'ing the ẽxperience of the Court of Appeal in the industrial relations field .
It has also al\\'ays been possible for en1ployers or workers to invoke the common law through the ordinary courts in son1e circumstances. l''his is a more controversial area. On the one hand there is the powerful argument that in a society which sets considerable store by the rule of law. no n1e1nbers or sections ofthe comn1unity should be above or beyond the law~ and if found to have acted unlawfully they should be answerable through the cou· rts in the ordinary way. If unions or etn players can break the law with in1punity simply because they are pursuing an industrial goal\ will not others in society in other situations clain1 the same freedom. and \vhere will that leave us? On the other hand there is the counter argument that large employers \Vith their greater econo:n1ic power are able to shift the industrial balance if they freely invoke the costly and ti1ne-consun1ing prooesscs of litigation through the general courts. and may even destroy effective unionisn1.
1'\vo recent cast:s in the Court of Appeal illustrate the problen1. The first i Nl!l!' Zealand Baking Trade .. \· En1ployees Industrial Union v Gene~a/ Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd ( 1985) . After a conciliated agreen1~, nt was reached~ the union sought to engage in second tier bargaining and \\'hen un successful began a strike. The cornpany con1n1enced an action against the union and the \vorkers clain1ing injunctions and an associated inquiry into damages. The High Court granted intcrirn injunctions restraining unions and workers from strikingorbeingpartytoany strike or instigating. aiding or abetting a strike. or being concerned directly or indirectly in corn n1itting acts or ornissions in the nature of a strike directed to or in support of a clain1 for an increase in ren1uneration during the term of the award.
A disputes con1 n1 ittee had earlier held against the union which appealed to the Arbitration Court.. and when the appeal fron1 the High Court against a grant of the injunctions was argued in the Court of AppeaL the hearing in the Arbitration Court was about to con1mence. At that Arbitration Court hearing. that Court was to be asked to determine whether the workers had the right to strike free of anclions under the Industrial Re' lations Act 1973. By then. too. the workers \Vere no longer on trike and accordingly the . injunctions against them were discharged. Then as to the union. all the judg1nents re~ognised the desirability of having industrial la\v disputes detennined in the first instance by the Arbitration Court. However. 4 men1bers of the Court of Appeal upheld the issuing of the · injunction against the union for it~duc~ng ~ b~e?~h of c~ntract ~ut. nar~owed the order. In the absence of a clear statutory dtrectton Inhibiting the tssue of tnJuncttons by the High Court and having regard to earlier a.., uthority recogni~ing theirav.ailability. the majority of the judges concluded that the High Court had a role tn that field tn that case.
I took a different vie\\' -na:mely that in the particular circumstances of that case the don1inant consideration was that the underlying industrial relations issues could and should be determined . first in ~he A~bitration C~urt and the injunction should be discharged. It see. med to tne that any 1ntruston by the Htgh Court. into industrial relations~ ẽven if there is jurisdiction. n1ust undermine to some extent the legislative policiẽs underlying the Industrial Relations Act 1973.1 added that such injunctions were rare because judges appreciated that the grant of an interin1 injunction in industrial n1atters necessarily shifted the balance of advantage without re~olving the underlying issues. That consideration is of course not lin1itcd to the industrial relations field. In recent years clain1s for interin1 injun(.:tions in all fi. elds have hurgconcd. Regrettably they often involve lengthy hearings followe· d by appeals. Very often the Jcl:ision on the interin1 injunction dctennines the practical outcon1c. My own view is that ~ourts should be reluctant to issue · interin1 injunctions. especially without notice to the other side. and that if there is urgency there ar· e considerable advantages in trying to fix an car' ly hearing oft he substantive clai1n rather than to have the n1atter dealt with in that often tactical \vay.
The ne\v Labour Relations Act reserves to the Labour Court full and cxclu ivejurisdiction to hear and determine applications for injunctions to slop a strike or lockout or to prevent a threatened strike or lockout. In short. that area ofjurisdiction has bc, en shifted fron1 the High Court to the Labour Court.
The second ca!'c is The New Zealand Seantens Industrial Union of J~1orkers v The Nauru Local Go\ 'ernrnent Council ( 1986) . As the result of industrial action a vessel called ··Enna G~· owned by the Nauru Local Governn1ent C'ouncil was held in the port ofWcli'i ngton for 112 days in 197 J. Part \vay through a lengthy hearing in the 1-1 igh , Court the Sean1cns Union adrnilh~d liability on one of the causes of action pleadeJ-that it had induced the Fijian sean1cn on the ·~En naG .. to refuse to take the vessel to sea and so to breach their contracts by representing that the union " 'Ould obtain for then1 higher \\'ages and better conditions. Darn ages \Vt:re as~essed at $63 568 \\'ith interest at the rate of 1 · 1 percent per year fron1 23 July '197 3 to the date of judgm, ent. eventually entered on 15 Decen1ber 1982. The union failed in its appeal on various datnagcs and costs questions, but the specia· l point about the case is that the Nauru Local · Go\ ernn1ent Council succeeded on its cross-appeal and the da1nages \\'ere increased by $142 11 0~ again \Vith interest for9 1 h years. What ra· ised the dan1ages probJen1 \Vas the finding in the High Court that the nev.r shipping service between Auckland and the Islands would have been a financial failur· e. and the .. Enna G .. would have been just as costly an investn1ent at sea as it \vas tied up · in port at ' Wellington. The High Court Judge \Vent on to hold that n1oney \'lhich the Nauru Local · Governn1ent Council would have spent any\vay without recoupn1ent fron1 profitable trading was not rẽcoverable as darn ages. nor could the Counci: l recover general darn ages fort he loss of use of the vessel.
We took a different view. The vessel was to be cn1ployed on this run for a · tnixture of social and econon1ic reasons and \Vith a vie\v to establishing a service hoped to be viable in the long tenn. The value of the use of an asset is not necessarily confined lo the in1n1ediate con1n1ercial re\vards and in our vie"' a plaintiff is not fairly con1pensated if it receives nothing for being deprived of the u e of a vessel beneficial to it. The total award against the Scarnens Union including that interest for 9 yẽars to 15 Decen1ber 1982 was over $400 000. and the judgn1cnt carried further interest fron1 the date ofjudgn1cnt in the High Court ( 15 Decernber 1982) do\vn to the date of actual payn1ent. So it was very expensive industrial action and no doubt will be seen as den1onstrating the risks undertaken by unions or en1ployer organisations in pursuing industria I solutions.
A. gain the new Act adopts the n1iddlc course. Jt does not exclude all recourse to la\v-rather it confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court to hear proceedings founded on 4 recognised areas of tort la\\' in \\'hich clain1s have developed in the industrial re\ations field. natnely conspiracy. inti111idation. inducctnent of breach of contract. and interference by unlawfu' l means \Vith trade. business. or en1ployn1ent (s ~42).
I turn nO\\' specifically to the second rna ncr I n1entioned earlier. the experience of the Court of Appeal in industrial relations cases in recent years. I have gone back 7 years. · ouring that time we have heard 1 S cases \Vhich have coane to the Court on appeal or b) \vay of case stated by the Arbitration Court. In thinking about today·s discussion I have reread all the decisions. However. rather than try to go through the cases \Vhich \\'Ould in any event be an unprofitable exercise. I prefer to n1ake a nun1ber of general points:
1.
Our jurisdiction is largely lin1ited to questions oflaw and in statistical tern1s we allowed 6 appeals against the Arbitration Court. and disn1issed II Uurisdiction was declined in one case).
2.
As tends to happen in other areas oflaw too. it is perhaps n1ore in those ca es which raise broad questions of legal policy and principle that appellate courts n1ay not be unaninlous. v He»,in ( 1982) where the n1anaging director of the 3 Guys Supennarket chain \vas held to have been wrongfully distnissed. l 'he tnethod of dis1nissal was ratiJ.er unusual. A lẽtter fro1n Mr Gubay to the n1anaging director recorded that the managing director was not the calibrẽ of man that Gubay \Van ted in the organisation and instructed the n1anaging director to adverti e his O\\'n job. The Court had no difficulty in concluding~ as had the High Court that the n1anaging director had been \Vrongfully disn1issed and so was entitled to dan1ages. The problen1 \Vas over their calculation. He had been contractually entitled to a bonus based on the annual profits. The nu1jority he. ld that the cornpensation should be determined on the hasis of the gross earnings the employee · would have received without any adjustn1ent for taxation. In doing so~ it departed fron1 the general approach taken by the House of Lords in Brirish Transporr Connnission "Gourley ( 1956) for a combination of reasons of policy and principle on the one hand and of tax legislation and the difficulties of ascertaining a fairly quanlifiable tax burden fairly attribulablẽ to the lost rcr11uneration on the other hand. The tninority Judge concluded that the fundamental principle is that dan1ages are con1pensatory and that to ignore tax \\'Ould significantly affect the coin pensa tory nature of the award.
Thus in both cases there were basic differences bet\veen the approaches of the :n1ajority to the legal iss ue. raising as it did broad questions of legal policy and principle.
3.
\Ve take very seriously the direction in (now) s 314 of the new Act and its counterpart in earlier legislation that we have regard to the special jurisdiction and powers of the Labour Court -the section goes on to refer specifically to the provisions of s 279(4) under \Vhich the Labour Court determines n1atters as in equity and good conscience it thinks fit: to s 303( 1) under \vhich it111ay accept. adn1it, and call for such evidence as in equity and good conscience it thinks fit~ to · 315 providing for the validation of in forn1al proceeding : and to s 31 7 conferringvlide procedural po\vers enabling the Labour Court ... the n1ore effectually to dispose of any n1ath.:r before it according to the sub tantial n1e rits and equitie of the case ... There are frequent reference in our judgn1ent to the special experl'ise o ft he specialised court and the advantages that thal court has overlhe Court of Appeal h1 the a sessrnent of industrial relations n1atters. Thus. Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. speaking for the Court in 'JVinsrone Clay Products Lirnired v Cartledge(lnspecror oj .Awards) ( 1984) "aid :
His noL to be ass um ed that propo~ition s of law. however prestigious and well cstahlishcd in th e High Cou rl or the Court ofAppeal. will apply with th~ san1c clear force in the Arbitration Court. Th tlt is a specialist Co urt. d esigned for a specific field . In the rnauers directed by tht: statute to co n1c befo re it. it has exclu sive jurisdiction. and. when cxcn.:ising it. it rnusttake into acco unl oth er co nsideratio ns besides legal i ·sue . It is concerned prin1arily with fairnc s. Thus it has bee n n1 ore th a n o nce said in thi s The High Court had issued a writ of sequestration against the property of the con1pany for disregarding an orderofthcArbitration Court to supply the union with a list ofnatnes of n1ernbers of · the con1pany's staff covered by the award. Four chartered accountant were appointed as sequestra tors of the cornpany which n1anufacturcd pizzas and had 3 retail outlets. We rejected the various argun1ents n1ade against the existence of a jurisdiction in the High Court to ordering sequestration but concluded that a 'fine was a n1ore appropriate ren1edy foreshadowing. as we put it "'the che· erJess prospect of further money sanctions. perhaps increasing at a specified an1ount per day while the conten1pt ren1ains u npurged'" (p. 618). The judgrnent also noted that sequestration · which is both drastic and blunt in its operation n1ay have devastating consequences on innocent third parties as it would have had on the en1ployees of Quality Pizzas \Vho would have had to be disn1issed if the sequestration had continued in its si rnple custodial forn1. We postponed the decision as to the appropriate level of the fine to give lhe con1pany further tin1e to consider its position. As it happened., Coli owing the judgn1cnt the con1pany repented. deliv, ered a list of nan1es of en1ploy· ees and \\'as fined.
5.
A nutnber of disn1issal cases have con1e on appeal. In Auckland City Council and Hennessy ( 1982) \\'e held . . as had the Arbitration Court that the \\'Ord ··unjustifiably'" could not be confined to matters of legal justification for the actual disn1issal: it also applied to the process followed by the employer. So an en1ployercarryingout an inquiry preceding a resignation or disn1issal n1ust do so in a fair and reasonable n1anner. Then in Marlborough Harbour Board v Goulden ( 1985) the Court suggested. without deciding, that a similar implication n1ight quite readily be found in private contracts of ernployment not subject to the 1973 Act This was for th, e reason as stated in the judgn1ent: .. Fair and reasonable treatment is so generally expected today of any en1-ployer that the la\\f may coine to recognise it as an ordinary obligation in a contract of service'". Principles ofnaturaljustice and fairness have an in1n1ediate public appeal. The practical difficulty is that as · in so n1any arẽas the courts could benefit fron1 expert advice as to the social and econon1ic costs and benefits of a change of the kind foreshado\ved. but the adversary p~ocess is not an ideal vehicle for conducting an extensive social inquiry and there is difficulty in ensuring that the relevant · rnaterial is actually before the Court and adequately tested. 6.
All in all. my impression is that the Court of Appeal has had a distinctly li1nited innuence on the interpretation and application of industrial relations legislation. That1nay reOect a particularly cautious approach on the part of the Court or. as son1e n1ight say, an unwillingness to respond to social change in this area. lt n1ay suggest that the specialist court arrangements are working particularly \veil. In any event it seetns consonant \Vith the. sch· erne and policy of the legislation that a court functioning as an appellate and rev1ew body on matters of law only should have a low. non-activist profile. 
